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Abstract
Since its establishment in 1948, the history of the National Health Service (NHS) has been characterized by 
organisational turbulence and system reform. At the same time, progress in science, medicine and technology 
throughout the western world have revolutionized the delivery of healthcare. The NHS has become a much loved, if 
much critiqued, national treasure. It is against this backdrop that the role of this state-funded health service has been 
brought into moral question. Certainly, the challenges facing healthcare policy-makers are numerous and complex, 
but in the wake of the Health and Social Care Act (2012), no issue is more divisive than that of market-based reform. 
Here we explore the turbulent history of the NHS, from its foundation to the birth of the healthcare marketplace. 
We explore arguments for and against the healthcare market and resolve that, amid an evolving economic and moral 
framework, the NHS must ensure that its original tenets of equity and autonomy remain at its core. We propose a 
values-explicit, systems-based approach to renew focus on both the processes and the outcomes of care. 
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Introduction – The turbulent politics of the National 
Health Service (NHS)
Founded by the post-war Attlee government of 1948, 
the National Health Service (NHS) was the first Western 
healthcare system to offer free and universal medical care 
at the point of delivery. Aneurin Bevan, the firebrand 
Welsh socialist and incumbent Minister of Health, was 
responsible for spearheading the nationalization of hospitals 
and extending the benefits of general practitioner care 
to the entire population (1). Bevan’s NHS represented a 
unique, collectivist approach to the provision of healthcare 
within a market society, with a firm emphasis on rational 
planning (2). Throughout its history, successive governments 
have endeavoured to reshape the structure of the NHS in 
accordance with changing demography and technology (2).
Under Thatcher, the Conservative Party of the late 1980s 
perceived the NHS as a venerable but stagnant organization 
(3). In the early 1990s, the Conservatives established the 
internal market; health authorities were able to manage their 
own budgets for the first time and could purchase health 
services from healthcare ‘providers’ (2). By exposing providers 
to market forces, resource allocation would become more 
efficient – or so the theory went (4). Quickly, the language 
of markets, choice and competition became the language 
of policy-makers. However, resistance to the market-based 
approach prevented a widespread move towards an explicitly 
mixed public-private model of healthcare provision and the 
internal market remained highly regulated (5). 
When it took office in 1997, the Labour Party changed the 
popular market-based vocabulary and removed several 
features of the market, such as the concentration on short-
term ‘spot transactions’ (6). However, the fundamental 
changes in service provision remained. By the end of the Blair 
premiership in 2007, the system had become increasingly 
patient-driven and pluralistic. 
To date, David Cameron’s coalition leadership has been 
defined by a reversal of the spectacular spending habits of 
Blair and Brown, and a return to tight fiscal discipline (7). 
Within this setting, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
was intended to create space for competition. It did this by 
creating novel commissioning frameworks known as Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) (8,9) and by allowing 
competition for the provision of healthcare between ‘any 
willing provider’, including the private sector. This has been 
referred to as the ‘external market’ (10).
Prior to 2012, in the context of healthcare that had been both 
publicly funded and publicly provided, tight regulation may 
have provided “little scope for ‘real markets’ in healthcare” 
(5). The sudden erosion of the boundary between public and 
private provision may “amount to the most ambitious attempt 
yet seen to apply a system of market regulation to the NHS” 
(11). Although there is little available evidence on the impact 
of this new approach, the media frenzy surrounding the 
proposal of the bill stimulated intense public and professional 
furore over the perceived ‘privatization’ of the NHS. 
The changing environment of the National Health Service 
(NHS)
The post-2000 era has been defined by a radical shift in the 
philosophy of healthcare policy-makers, as the economic and 
socio-demographic environment of the NHS has changed in 
a fashion that Attlee et al. could not possibly have conceived 
(2). The British economy is increasingly focused on services 
and information technology, as opposed to manufacturing; 
service provision is now consumer- rather than producer-
driven. With greater access to information and knowledge, 
personal autonomy has expanded for the vast majority of the 
population (6). With the rise of the internet, the patient has 
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been reborn as a consumer, and the attitudes of some service 
users have changed significantly (12,13).
Demand for healthcare has not only expanded, but also 
evolved. Pharmacological and technological progress, 
particularly in surgical and diagnostic equipment, has opened 
vast new therapeutic avenues. The burden of infectious 
disease has been replaced by new epidemics, principally 
cardiovascular disease and cancer (2). With an ageing 
population, the management of chronic conditions such as 
dementia has become central to the effective running of the 
health service. Long hospital stays are now a rarity; day case 
surgery accounts for over 80% of all operations performed 
(2). The development of a wide range of technologies 
including imaging, multi-factorial risk algorithms, molecular 
and genomic profiling is facilitating prediction of the 
predisposition of healthy individuals to future disease. This 
has been accompanied by an increase in prophylactic or 
proactive rather than reactive treatments. Given this context 
in which the NHS finds itself, it is hardly surprising that the 
healthcare market has reached the forefront of the policy- 
maker’s agenda. 
Alongside these cultural and epidemiological changes 
throughout the UK, the environment within the NHS is 
changing, described by Care Quality Commission chairman 
David Prior in 2013 as ‘chillingly defensive’. The workforce 
has become more fragmented, with higher staff turnover 
and greater dependence on locums (2). Low morale of NHS 
staff, associated with pay freezes, under-staffing, financially-
driven outcome targets and hierarchical top-down directives 
in the absence of bottom-up feedback, was one of the factors 
identified in the Francis report on the mid Staffordshire 
scandal as contributing to a culture “not conducive to 
providing good care for patients” (14). In light of this 
recognition, the current challenge faced by the NHS is how to 
turn a competitive, market-based system into an organization 
that learns from its mistakes and from patient-feedback and 
that builds rather than breaks the morale of its workers. We 
will argue that the key to this process will be in re-establishing 
ethical principles at the heart of the health service. 
The healthcare market – a hotbed of debate 
The intellectual roots of the healthcare market emerged from 
the work of Alain Enthoven in the early 1980s. Enthoven 
noted that flexibility and purchaser power could be increased 
by ‘outsourcing’ and independently purchasing traditionally 
in-house functions (15,16). He used the example of the Ford 
Motor Company to elucidate this theory: although Ford 
initially hoped to control the full ‘chain of command’ – the 
panel-making, the steel-making to make the panels, the iron 
production to produce the steel, and so on – the industry later 
saw the merits of focusing the efforts of the workforce on the 
jobs they did best, while stimulating competition between 
suppliers (15–17). 
While sole reliance on non-market mechanisms has 
identifiable problems, evidence of the effects of competition 
within a healthcare system is equivocal. Empirical research 
has shown both positive (18) and negative (19,20) effects 
of competition on quality of care. The theoretical benefits 
of competition include increased responsiveness to the 
needs of consumers, the flexibility to increase and reduce 
supply quickly when required, greater efficiency, and the 
encouragement of innovation (21). However, as Peter Smith, 
a leading British health economist, points out: “Markets confer 
benefits on society only in special circumstances” (22). “In no 
sector of the economy can the departure from the neoclassical 
economist’s assumptions underlying a competitive market be 
more pronounced than in the field of healthcare” (23). This 
is due to a number of factors including major information 
gaps between providers and consumers and the key role 
of providers in influencing the healthcare that consumers 
receive (22).
In addition to its potential benefits, competition can produce 
instability, variations in performance and inequalities. 
Therefore the effective implementation of market-type 
mechanisms requires rigorous oversight to ensure that 
objectives such as equity and comprehensive healthcare are 
not compromised. 
The application of market competition may be very 
different depending on the nature of the healthcare service 
being provided. The negative impact may be small in acute 
healthcare settings where patient groups are relatively 
homogeneous and outcome measures are easily defined 
(i.e. accurate) and consistent (i.e. reliable). In this scenario, 
well-managed competition may confer benefits. However, it 
is difficult to envisage these positive effects in the treatment 
of heterogeneous patient groups with chronic conditions in 
which there are few accurate or reliable measures of outcome. 
In addition, the propensity of inter-institutional competition 
to fragment care, threatening continuity and integration 
(21) may have a direct impact on the treatment of chronic 
conditions in which complex patient pathways are highly 
reliant on interactions with other agencies such as social care 
(22). It has been suggested that this effect can be inferred from 
the poorer outcomes of patients with chronic or multiple 
diseases in the fragmented U.S. healthcare system compared 
with European systems (24,25). 
Overall, empirical evidence to suggest that the private health 
sector is inherently more efficient than the public sector is 
lacking. On the contrary, research has suggested that publicly 
funded healthcare organizations may outperform private 
providers. The intellectual challenge to the healthcare market 
is poignantly described by Thomas Rice: “We have examined 
... the assumptions that would need to be fulfilled to ensure that 
a free market results in the best outcome for society; we found 
none of them even close to being met in health ... economic theory 
provides no basis for assuming the superiority of competitive 
approaches” (26). 
Within a sector such as healthcare, productivity gains are 
necessarily limited by a reliance on human interaction – a 
phenomenon known as Baumol’s cost disease (27,28). Just as a 
string quartet requires four musicians, so a doctor is required 
to take a history in order to make a reliable diagnosis; history 
taking cannot simply be cut from the medical agenda. Hence, 
the healthcare market cannot simply ramp up productivity 
in the way that other markets might, without compromising 
the healthcare processes and relationships intrinsic to good 
patient care. 
Whereas previously the internal market of the NHS allowed 
competition between NHS healthcare providers, the Health 
and Social Care Act of 2012 made a radical change in 
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opening up the market to ‘any willing provider’ including the 
private sector. This has set a precedent for the development 
of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) (29,30). Within this 
system, contracts are structured around specified operational, 
clinical and financial outputs, such that accountability can 
be maintained (31). However, as changes in global banking 
regulations have led to restrictions in long-term lending, so 
the absence of liquidity has increased interest rates on project 
finance to historically high levels, and the ability of public-
private partnerships to generate economic value for healthcare 
commissioners has fallen (31). In addition, the marketplace 
remains burdened by regulation, with each contract entailing 
administrative costs through procurement processes, lawyers’ 
fees, and audit (32,33).
Some of the risks of PPPs within the healthcare market have 
been successfully expounded by the health service unions 
and the left wing commentariat. In accordance with the 
inverse care law (34), private providers may prioritize patients 
according to lowest risk rather than greatest need. This 
‘cherry-picking’ may result in an investment bias favoring 
the younger, healthier, more affluent members of society. 
Without stringent and complete contracts that generate the 
right incentive frameworks, providers may be inclined to 
reduce operational costs at the expense of service quality (35).
An evolving moral framework
One of the Government’s popular catchphrases – “no decision 
about me, without me” (36) – illustrates a number of related 
points. If a patient is to be the driver of his or her own 
healthcare, then decisions about that care must be made as 
openly and as locally as possible. The devolution of control 
to local CCGs involving local doctors, patients and managers 
in resource allocation has been an attempt to facilitate this. 
Yet within a morally pluralistic society, it is inevitable that 
policy-making, however localized, will bring conflict. In the 
context of healthcare expansion and evolution described 
previously, it is all the more important that policy-makers 
seek to understand the many and varied moral issues they 
face and how to respond most effectively, managing public 
expectations and incorporating moral and ethical frameworks 
into policy-making (37). To achieve this, policy-makers 
must learn to communicate effectively and expansively 
by embracing, rather than fearing, the media machine, 
principally the press, the internet and social media outlets.
A major moral issue facing policy-makers is healthcare 
rationing. In recognising that not all healthcare needs 
can be met there is a need for distributive justice, whereby 
benefits and burdens are fairly distributed (38). Although the 
delegation of power from a national level to local CCGs may 
promote individual autonomy, an ethical concern is raised 
by the risk of exacerbating the ‘postcode lottery’, in terms 
of the quality and quantity of services available, as has been 
admitted by leading figures at the Department of Health (39). 
Although a degree of disparity in services nationwide may 
be inevitable (though not desirable) within any system, it is 
arguable that market forces potentiate such inequalities in 
healthcare delivery, principally by localising treatment-based 
decisions at the level of the CCG.
An additional concern is that at a local level, primary care 
physicians are increasingly conflicted between their duties 
towards individual patients and towards local resource 
allocation in their role as CCG rationers (40). This has 
important potential effects on both medical morale and 
clinical judgement and inevitably changes the balance of the 
doctor-patient relationship. 
A number of critics are morally opposed to the introduction 
of market-based systems to healthcare. Michael Sandel 
describes the “corrosive tendency of markets” and their 
ability to exaggerate inequality between purchasers (41). 
Some deem this to undermine the principles upon which the 
NHS was founded. Alan Cribb has emphasized the negative 
impact of market forces on the nature of ‘health-care goods’, 
described as “the aggregative, distributive, or relational 
conceptions of health-care ends (e.g. population health, health 
equity, solidarity)” (5). The currently output-driven system 
may predispose to distortion of priorities and ritualization 
of practices, with clinical encounters focused on achieving 
performance indicators rather than good patient care: a 
tick-box approach. This might result in improved efficiency 
according to a single outcome-measure, potentially at the 
expense of care quality. Increased budget consciousness may 
subvert the motives of doctors, compromising impartiality, 
while inter-institutional comparison and competition may 
result in fragmentation of care. 
The solution: a values-explicit, systems-based approach 
We have highlighted some of the negative impacts of market 
forces on both healthcare distribution and the nature of 
healthcare goods in the context of a changing environment 
in which there is increasing demand for healthcare and 
decreasing morale of NHS staff. We propose renewed focus 
on two approaches: values-explicit and systems-based 
healthcare, in an attempt to change this situation, alongside 
modification of the Health and Social Care Act to prevent 
involvement of the private sector in competing for healthcare 
provision.   
Values-Explicit
By a values-explicit approach, we mean two things: 1) values 
should be introduced alongside and as a means of regulating, 
market forces; 2) these values should be explicit and consistent 
throughout the NHS from the Department of Health 
downwards in an attempt to align the goals of and overcome 
the clashes of principles between front line clinicians, market 
managers and politicians.
Critics of the market-based approach have argued that 
healthcare represents the moral-limit of markets (41) and that 
the values upon which the NHS was founded and competitive 
market-forces are fundamentally incompatible. Whether 
there is a degree to which such values can be incorporated 
within a market-based system is controversial. We do not 
believe that abolition of the ‘internal market’ is the answer, 
as the theoretical benefits of a market-approach may be 
achievable under tight regulation. However, the introduction 
of private sector competition by the Health and Social 
Care Act may have been a step too far towards ‘unbridled 
capitalism’. From both an economic and a moral stand point 
the NHS might benefit from the repeal of this aspect of the 
act. Irrespective of the form in which markets remain part of 
the NHS, we suggest that a values-based approach to market 
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regulation will be critical.
For example, the expected consequence of market forces 
applied to local decisions about healthcare rationing is an 
exacerbation of the ‘postcode lottery’. An increase in the 
scope and power of National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) with explicit guidance on the values-focus 
of healthcare rationing—equity, fairness and maximization 
of individual autonomy—may serve to dampen nationwide 
healthcare inequalities. Additionally, a focus on value-based 
processes and quality of care may prevent the distortion 
of clinical judgement and erosion of the doctor-patient 
relationship that is a potential consequence of current 
outcome-based financial rewards.
Although the current government has been keen to 
depoliticize the day-to-day running of the health service, for 
example through the creation of NHS England, the market-
based, competitive language of policy-makers has inevitably, 
over time, percolated through the system to clinicians. In 
addition, clinicians are increasingly involved in decisions that 
might be deemed political, such as rationing and distribution 
of local healthcare resources, which could be seen to have 
done the very opposite, politicizing the day-to-day running of 
healthcare. This has magnified the clash of principles between 
front line clinicians, market managers and politicians. An 
increased focus of market managers and politicians on 
values-based healthcare may help to align the motives of 
policy-makers, managers and doctors. These values should be 
explicit at every level of the NHS, providing a shared vision 
with a view to “commitment and enrolment rather than 
compliance” (42).
Systems-Based
In the face of a values-explicit approach to healthcare, a 
significant problem remains. The healthcare service offered 
in England cannot be understood simplistically in terms 
of the 40,000 consultations and 200,000 clinical decisions 
taking place every day, but rather by the relationships 
between consultations and the various services required 
(6). In the context of scientific and technological advances 
in healthcare, interactions between patients and healthcare 
services are becoming increasingly multiplicative. Current 
predominantly linear NHS systems are poorly adapted to deal 
with this and the fragmentation of care that results from inter-
institutional competition creates a barrier to the integration 
of complex care. 
The application of a systems approach – the ‘fifth discipline’, 
as proposed by Peter Senge – to business organizations, 
has aided the transformation of companies into learning 
organizations that are able to understand and deal with 
complexity (42). We support the application of a systems 
approach to healthcare, as advocated by Sir Muir Gray 
(6). By looking holistically at the healthcare system and at 
the relationships between its elements, complexity can be 
managed more effectively (43). Rather than focusing on 
notions of primary, secondary and tertiary care, the systems 
approach focuses around complete, integrative pathways 
for health problems and conditions. Theoretical advantages 
include reducing variation in quality and outcomes, reducing 
health inequalities, reducing patient harm, reducing waste 
and improving disease prevention (6). By providing clear 
objectives and receiving continuous feedback, this approach 
has the unique advantage of flexibility, which may avoid the 
need for structural reorganization (6). Furthermore, the NHS 
must learn to embrace what Castells terms the ‘drivers of 
the third industrial revolution’: citizens, knowledge, and the 
internet (44,45). These goals are most likely to be achieved 
through the adoption of a systems-based approach. 
In the dynamic environment of the healthcare system, only 
the patient is constant. The patient’s constancy must be 
embraced by considering patients as pivotal members of 
clinical teams and by building systems around patients. 
Patient-held medical records would be one example of a 
pragmatic and morally appropriate solution to achieve these 
goals. More generally, the feedback of patients, relatives and 
carers will prove critical to service planning and delivery, 
emphasising the importance of patient representation 
within CCGs. 
Within a systems-based approach, the competitive focus of the 
internal market could be exchanged for one of collaboration, 
in which commissioners and providers seek to work together. 
Even competitors can collaborate, as described by the concept 
of ‘co-opetition’ (46,47), whereby competing organizations 
can successfully develop innovations together. The illustration 
of the ant colony is enlightening: ants cooperate within their 
own colony, but compete, if necessary, with other colonies. For 
example, worker ants within a colony are non-reproductive, 
working only to benefit the reproductive capabilities of the 
Queen. Ageing workers emigrate to nests at the boundary 
of the colony to provide the first line of defence against 
neighbouring colonies, protecting younger and more viable 
members of the colony (48). Without a hierarchy or a market, 
ants successfully develop solutions to problems. 
The origins of this behavior are contentious with some 
viewing it purely in survival terms; others describing it as 
altruistic (48). To an extent, these views can be reconciled. 
If our conception of evolution by natural selection is correct, 
this contention arises from the inevitability that the genes 
persisting at the expense of others are selfish, even if they 
prescribe altruism (48). However, if “altruism is defined 
in the original lexical manner as self-denying behavior 
performed for the benefit of others” (48), its application to 
ants is justified. Such altruism in ant colonies can be thought 
of as providing survival benefit in terms of reciprocity: kin-
altruism (whereby genes favoring altruism towards genetic 
relations increase their own propagation by nature of shared 
genetic material). Whether these theories of evolutionary 
benefit entirely account for the origins of altruistic behavior 
is debatable. 
Within a business relationship, altruistic behavior can benefit 
an individual via reciprocity or via the shared benefits of 
working together towards a mutual goal. For example in the 
automotive industry, two rival companies may decide to work 
together on a new engine, sharing technologies to make it 
economically viable and beneficial to both, even though they 
will later compete against each other through the application 
of this engine to different models (49). In healthcare, co-
opetition could mean the collaboration of providers focusing 
on different components of a pathway in an integrative 
manner that is mutually beneficial, by reducing costs and 
providing a competitive advantage over other providers 
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focusing on individual aspects of care. An existing framework 
around which co-opetition may evolve are the restrictions 
imposed by competition law reflected by the Principles and 
Rules for Cooperation and Competition (50) as applied 
to both private and public healthcare providers, regulated 
by Monitor and the Office of Fair Trading. These regulate 
procurement of NHS services, anti-competitive behaviors, 
mergers between organizations, and false and misleading 
advertising of NHS services, striking a balance between the 
benefits of co-operation and competition (51).
What is often seen to set humans apart from other species is 
the existence of genuine, ‘disinterested altruism’ (52), where 
neither reciprocity nor benefits to kin can explain altruistic 
behavior. As expounded by Richard Dawkins, “Our conscious 
foresight – our capacity to simulate the future in imagination 
– could save us from the worst selfish excesses of the blind 
replicators. We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our 
birth and if necessary the selfish memes of our indoctrination. 
We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and 
nurturing pure, disinterested altruism – something that has no 
place in nature” (52). 
In his discussion of the morality of markets in healthcare, 
Daniel Callahan quotes Plato’s work on altruism from The 
Republic: “Plato writes that the physician ... studies only 
the patient’s interest, not his own ... Plato’s description of the 
ethically responsible physician is that, while the physician must 
be some kind of merchant, selling his skills, his highest aim must, 
to be true to his profession, to be altruistic ... Plato believed that 
the physician who sold his services could do so without harming 
the altruistic core of medicine” (53). Whether altruism can be 
maintained in the face of competitive markets, as with other 
values underlying healthcare, is controversial. However, given 
the fundamental importance of altruism underlying truly 
patient-centered care, a values explicit model should nurture 
altruism as one of its core principles. 
Conclusion
Despite constant change, both in its environment and its 
internal structure, the NHS has adhered to the values of its 
founding fathers. In essence, it remains a universal, free, 
tax-financed system – features which continue to command 
support across the political spectrum today. The market 
approach, introduced as a means of improving quality whilst 
controlling public expenditure, remains controversial. For the 
service to retain its moral credibility, it must remain patient-
centric, reconciling values of equity and autonomy. These 
fundamental principles should form the basis not only of 
clinical practice, but also of policy-making. At all levels of the 
NHS, two questions should be asked about any new policy or 
guideline: i) are the values explicit?; and ii) has a systems-based 
approach been adopted? We believe that drawing attention to 
these two aspects will be as important in improving quality 
and cost-effectiveness as the current focus on competitive 
markets. A values-explicit, systems-based approach would 
focus on both the process and the outcomes of care. It could 
transform the NHS into a learning organization with huge 
benefits for both patients and providers.
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